Abstract-Joint encryption-encoding schemes has been released to fulfill both reliability and security desires in a single step. Using Low Density Parity Check (LDPC) codes in joint encryption-encoding schemes, as an alternative to classical linear codes, would shorten the key size as well as improving error correction capability. In this article, we present a joint encryption-encoding scheme using Quasi Cyclic-Low Density Parity Check (QC-LDPC) codes based on finite geometry. We observed that our proposed scheme not only outperforms in its key size and transmission rate, but also remains secure against all known cryptanalyses of code-based secret key cryptosystems. We subsequently show that our scheme benefits from low computational complexity. In our proposed joint encryption-encoding scheme, by taking the advantage of QC-LDPC codes based on finite geometries, the key size decreases to 1/5 of that of the so far best similar system. In addition, using our proposed scheme a plenty of different desirable transmission rates is achievable. The wide variety of codes proposed here makes our cryptosystem applicable on a number of different communication and cryptographic standards.
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I. INTRODUCTION
T HE code-based cryptosystems first introduced by McEliece [1] . The security of this cryptosystem is based on general decoding problem, which is known as an NP-complete problem [2] . Although at the time of writing this paper, no algorithm running on quantum computers has been published to break the code-based cryptosystems, its large key size and low transmission rate in comparison with the prevalent cryptosystems such as RSA and ElGamal made these cryptosystems unusable from implementation and standard prospective.
After McEliece published his public key code-based cryptosystem [2] , Rao in 1984 proposed a secret key cryptosystem based on the McEliece public key cryptosystem [3] . In 1986, Rao and Nam made a security modification [4] . In 1987, Struik and Tilburg pointed some weaknesses of the Rao-Nam cryptosystem and proposed the improved version [5] . In 2000, a secret key code-based cryptosystem with much shorter key was introduced [6] . In conventional communication systems the encryption and encoding done separately and in series. In 2008, a joint encryption-encoding scheme has been proposed which benefits from lower complexity in compare with separate encryption and encoding [7] . This scheme is using QC-LDPC codes. The quasi cyclic structure helps to shorten the key size. Moreover, this scheme gains benefits from fast decoding algorithm and superior error performance of LDPC codes. In 2012, another scheme using QC-LDPC codes based on Extended Difference Families (EDF) was proposed [8] , which could not achieve further improvement on the key size. In 2014, a joint encryption-encoding scheme with the novel idea of puncturing instead of adding a perturbation vector has been introduced [9] . Then in 2015, Esmaeili and Gulliver added random insertions to improve the security of their system [10] . In [11] , agreed random error vectors was added to their encryption process. In [12] , they used a random interleaving instead of random insertions and deletions. While in [11] , [12] the code is public, the cryptosystem is an encoding then encryption system rather than a joint encryption-encoding scheme. Besides, it is shown that the use of two pairs of LFSRs has laid Esmaeili-Gulliver cryptosystem vulnerable against ciphertext-only attack [13] . Furthermore, a recent work on joint encryption-encoding scheme which uses polar codes as generator matrix is supposed to result in relatively smaller key size and higher level of security as well as higher code rate [14] .
Although the key size of recent works reduced considerably in comparison to the trailblazing code-based studies, it is about 13 times larger than the key size of conventional AES-128. Due to this fact, attaining a more compact secret key is one of our motivations through this paper. Besides shortening the secret key, increasing the transmission rate, decreasing the complexity of algorithm, and efficiently correcting channel errors as well as keeping the cryptosystem secure are the most challenging issues in joint encryption-encoding researches. Solving these issues needs a proper family of codes to be utilized. This code should possess the following characteristics:
• Efficiently decodable • A family with large cardinality • Achievable high transmission rate • Compressible matrices in the secret key In this paper we proposed a joint encryption-encoding scheme utilizing QC-LDPC codes based on finite geometry (FG-QC-LDPC) in order to obtain our goal which is introducing a practical solution for the above issues. There arXiv:1711.04611v1 [cs.IT] 13 Nov 2017 is a correspondence with desired features of the parity check matrix of a QC-LDPC code and properties of the finite geometry. Moreover, every line in finite geometry can be identified through each of two points lying on that. This property enables shortening the key size to 20% of the so far best known joint encryption-encoding scheme. The wide acceptable range in the parameters of our proposed scheme makes it suitable for various applications and different levels of security. Furthermore, we show that the FG-QC-LDPC joint scheme is secure against all known cryptanalyses of such schemes.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II recalls some basic facts about finite geometry and QC-LDPC codes derived from them. Next, the description of our new joint encryption-encoding scheme using FG-QC-LDPC codes is given in Section III. The security and performance including key size, error performance, and complexity of our scheme are discussed in Section IV. Finally, Section V summarizes and concludes the paper.
II. PRELIMINARIES
We took advantage of Quasi Cyclic Low Density Parity Check codes based on Finite Geometry (FG-QC-LDPC) in our proposed joint encryption-encoding scheme. We took the advantages of this family of linear block codes to achieve our designated goals, namely improving the performance in comparison to the best known systems in the literature and also keeping the system secure against all known cryptanalyses.
A. QC-LDPC
Since Gallager [15] proposed LDPC codes, different methods for constructing these codes has been suggested to the literature [16] - [19] . Each of them has different characteristics. In cryptographic applications, quasi-cyclic LDPC codes allows us to reduce the key size as well as the complexity in comparison with the general LDPC codes [20] . The parity check matrix of a QC-LDPC code is represented as follows,
where each H i is a circulant block of size p × p. Each row vector of a circulant block is circularly shifted one element to the right relative to the preceding row vector. A QC-LDPC code with the above parity check matrix (Eq.(1)) has the code length n = n 0 ×p, the redundancy r = r 0 ×p = (n 0 −k 0 )×p, and the code dimension or equally the message length k = k 0 × p.
Decoding LDPC codes using iterative decoders helps to get close to channel capacity. Iterative decoding, also known as "belief propagation decoding" or "message passing decoding", could be done in various ways, including sum-product algorithm (SPA) and bit-flipping algorithm (BFA) [21] . SPA uses soft-decoding while BFA uses hard-decoding method. Since our joint encryption-encoding scheme designed for channels affected with soft types of noises like Additive White Gaussian Noise (AWGN), we utilizes SPA decoder.
Construction of the parity check matrix of a QC-LDPC code should follow an algorithm that avoids creation of length four girth in its Tanner graph. Equally, in the parity check matrix, there should be no two columns with more than one nonzero elements in the same locations.
There are different families of QC-LDPC codes used in code-based cryptography, namely, Extended Difference Family (EDF) [8] , [20] , and Random Difference Family (RDF) [22] , [23] . In our scheme we proposed using finite geometry to construct circulant blocks of parity check matrix. This helps us to attain a shorter secret key than which is available in the literature for the joint encryption-encoding scheme.
B. Finite Geometry
A finite geometry is composed of finite number of points. In this paper we focus on two types of finite geometry, namely projective geometry (PG) and Euclidean geometry (EG). The definitions of this subsection is generally provided from [21] and [24] .
1) Euclidean Geometry:
where p is prime and s is a natural number form a vector space. This vector space is also known as the finite Euclidean geometry of dimension m over GF (q), denoted by EG(m, q). Vector additions and scalar multiplications of these m-tuples are conducted in GF (q). 
Therefore, the number of all lines in the EG(m, q) is as follows,
2) Euclidean Geometry Without Origin: By omitting the origin and all lines intersecting at the origin a new geometry appears which is denoted by EG * (m, q).
If α is a primitive in GF (q m ), then α i for 0 ≤ i ≤ q m − 2 represents the elements of GF (q m ). So the incident vector of the line F is as given below, 
No. of points in each line
No. of lines intersecting at each point
where
In this geometry circularly shifted incident vector of a line is an incident vector for another line [24] . This property partitions the set of all lines, J o , into N c,EG * cyclic classes.
These cyclic classes enables us to generate circulant blocks for the parity check matrix of the QC-LDPC codes. Pointing out that each row vector of these circulant blocks is an incident vector. All necessary information of Euclidean geometry is portrayed in Table I. 3) Projective Geometry: Consider the Galois field GF (q m+1 ) and α, a primitive element in this field. So
and β = α n . Then the order of α is q − 1. Now, 0, β 0 , β 1 , , β q−2 forms the elements of GF (q). Considering the definition of α and β, all non-zero elements of GF (q m+1 ) can be partitioned in n disjoint subsets as given below,
Each of the above subset represent a distinct point in projective geometry, which is denoted by P G(m, q). In this geometry each line consists of q + 1 points, formed by linear combination of two distinct α j1 and α j2 points as given below, No. of lines
The number of lines intersecting at every particular point is
, which is obtained by dividing the remaining number of points chosen as the second point of line (= n − 1) by the number of other points in each line (= q).
Let
If m is even, all lines in P G(m, q) has primitive incident vector and partitioned into N c,even = q m −1 q 2 −1 cyclic classes, where each cyclic class consists of n lines. If m is odd, only J 0 lines of P G(m, q) has primitive incident vector [23] .
These incident vectors is partitioned into N c,odd cyclic classes.
All necessary information of projective geometry is portrayed in Table II . In finite geometry, since there is exactly one line connecting two distinct points, no two incident vectors has more than one non-zero elements in the same location. As a result of this property, the girth of QC-LDPC codes based on finite geometry is at least 6.
C. FG-QC-LDPC Codes
In our scheme we exploited a QC-LDPC code with one block row which is in the form of
Each H i is a circulant block of size p × p which can be shaped only by its first row (column). In FG-QC-LDPC codes as a subset of QC-LDPC codes, the first rows of circulant blocks derived from incident vectors of a line in that geometry. Thanks to the geometric construction, each line and therefore the incident vector of them can be identified by only two points lying on that line. This helps us to shorten the key size, which its description is given in Section IV. The number of circulant blocks in the parity check matrix, n 0 , limited to the number of cyclic classes in that particular geometry, i.e. n 0 ≤ N c .
The parity check matrix derived from finite geometry has the following characteristics. The parameters used bellow corresponds to the parameters given in Table I and II.
• The Hamming weight of each row in each circulant block denoted by ρ is equal to the number of points lying on each line in that finite geometry.
• The size of each circulant block is p × p, where p is the number of all points in that geometry.
• No two columns has more than one common locations of 1s. This is due to the fact that two distinct lines in finite geometry are either disjoint or intersecting at only one point.
• The Tanner graph contains no length 4 cycles.
• The length of codeword is n = n 0 × p.
• The length of message vectors or equally the dimension of the code is k = (n 0 − 1) × p = k 0 × p
III. FG-QC-LDPC JOINT ENCRYPTION-ENCODING SCHEME
Here is the description of the proposed joint encryption-encoding scheme based on FG-QC-LDPC codes in three different steps, that is, key generation, encryption-encoding, and decryption-decoding. We discuss the range of suitable parameters used in the proposed scheme.
A. Key Generation
The secret key of the joint encryption-encoding scheme is composed of a parity check matrix, H, a permutation matrix, P , and the seed of the Pseudo Random Number Generator (PRNG).
1) Parity Check Matrix: The parity check matrix of the FG-QC-LDPC code given by (10) can be constructed based on either Euclidean geometry or projective geometry. The construction procedure first start with choosing between these two types of geometries and their parameters. According to the Section II, a finite geometry is defined in terms of two parameters, that is, its dimension, m, and the corresponding field, GF (q).
As discussed in the Section II, in both cases of Euclidean and projective geometries all lines are partitioned into different cyclic classes. Each cyclic class in a finite geometry forms a set of rows of a circulant block. Thus, for generating a circulant block H i one needs to simply specify a cyclic class and then assign only its first row.
In the case of EG, the number of cyclic classes, according to the Table I and the number of lines in each cyclic class is p = q m − 1 which is equal to the length of each row vector of circulant blocks.
In the case of PG, the number of cyclic classes is N c,even
, when the dimension of the geometry is even or odd, respectively. Here, the number of lines in each cyclic class is p =
To sum up with the generation of the parity check matrix, we should choose public parameters, that is, the type of geometry, its dimension m, its corresponding filed GF (q), and the number of circulant blocks of the matrix, n 0 . Then each circulant block must be generated in the above fashion.
2) Permutation Matrix: In our scheme, the permutation matrix is a block diagonal matrix in the form of
Where each π block is an l × l permutation matrix.
3) The PRNG Seed: In order to generate a sequence of perturbation vectors e P we should utilize a PRNG. Thus, in order to use the same sequence as perturbation vectors by the transmitter and the receiver, it suffices they agree on the same seed for the PRNG. The sequence generated by the PRNG is then divided into (n − k)-bit vectors, z. The perturbation vectors are computed by e P = H −1 .z, where H −1 is the right inverse of H. Therefore, the perturbation vector e P is of length n. Different PRNGs can be employed depending on the hardware/software resources and applications of the joint encryption-encoding scheme.
B. Encryption-Encoding
For doing joint encryption-encoding, the transmitter needs to compute the generator matrix G from the parity check matrix H. In QC-LDPC codes with parity check matrix in the form of one block row, the generator matrix can be constructed as given below,
Note that for G being used as the generator matrix, it is sufficient for at least one circulant block, H i , to be non-singular. Without loss of generality, we assume that the circulant block H n0−1 is a non-singular matrix.
Next, the transmitter generates the perturbation vector e P as given below,
where z is an (n − k)-bit vector produced by the PRNG and the right inverse of parity check matrix is computed through a public algorithm such as given in [7] .
Finally, the ciphertext is obtained as follows,
C. Decryption-Decoding
We assume that the error vector e is added to the ciphertext through a noisy channel between the transmitter and the receiver. Thus, we denote the received vector by r = c + e = (mG + e p )P + e
This algorithm works as follows:
1) Find the inverse permutation, P −1 .
2) Multiply both sides of (15) by P −1 .
3) Subtract the perturbation vector e P from r
4) Decode c ′ using belief propagation algorithm to find m.
Note that the e ′ = e.P −1 has the same Hamming weight as e. 
D. The Code Parameters
To deploy a right EG-QC-LDPC or PG-QC-LDPC code, the length and the rate and the density of the parity check matrix should be chosen properly. Our search results reflects the parameter values for different codes among which we have selected those codes which suggest various code rates and higher number of possible parity check matrices. Thus we have summarized some suitable codes in Table III and IV. 1) Code Rate: The code rate of QC-LDPC codes with one block row is as follows.
The code rates in different communication standards varies from 1/5 in DVB-S2 [25] to 14/15 in IEEE 802.15.3c [26] . Therefore, the suitable parameters is bounded within this range.
2) Code Length: The code lengths of EG-QC-LDPC and PG-QC-LDPC are as follows using the parameters of Table I and II.
Similarly, different code lengths in standards bound our search for suitable parameters from 336 bits in ITU-T G9960 [27] to 64800 bits in DVB-S2 [25] .
3) Parity Check Matrix Density: A parity check matrix of density 0.01 or lower is categorized as a low density parity check matrix. LDPC codes of density about 0.001 has better error performance [28] . The density of the parity check matrices of EG-QC-LDPC and PG-QC-LDPC codes are given below, respectively,
where ρ is the Hamming weight of the incident vector of each line in the geometry and p is its length.
IV. SECURITY AND PERFORMANCE
In order to evaluate a joint encryption-encoding scheme, also known as secure channel coding scheme, we investigate the scheme from security and efficiency prospective, namely, key size, error performance, and complexity of the scheme. Our attitude towards the design of the FG-QC-LDPC joint encryption-encoding scheme is to decrease the key size as well as complexity of the scheme while improving error performance in comparison with the so far best previous schemes in the literature. In addition, keeping it secure against all known cryptanalytic attacks.
A. Security
Provable security for symmetric key cryptography is an open problem. There exists no natural hard problem that the security of the symmetric scheme can be reduced to. By the way, to examine symmetric schemes there is a method to reduce the security of that scheme to the problem of distinguishing between an oracle which encrypts a message with a random key and an oracle which outputs a random ciphertext [29] . This reduction in oracle model for chosen-plaintext attack on symmetric key cryptosystems is given in [30] , which is applicable to analyze the security of modes of operations using a secure block cipher. Besides, Menezes in his talk argued against the role of provable security as a real "proof". He claimed that provable security is a "tool" and old-fashioned cryptanalysis is more reasonable in practical point of view [31] .
Based on the level of a-priori knowledge, which is available to the cryptanalyst, there are different classes of cryptanalyses. We have examined our scheme against brute force, ciphertext-only, message resend, and chosen-plaintext attacks.
1) Brute Force Attack: The secret key consists of the parity check matrix, H; the permutation matrix, P; and the seed of the PRNG, S. Each of these parameters must be chosen large enough in order to keep our scheme secure against brute force attack.
The number of parity check matrices of FG-QC-LDPC codes is as follows. where N c is the number of cyclic classes on that geometry. Let s denotes the desired security parameter of our scheme, then in the (23) we can simply assign the number of blocks, n 0 , and the block size, p, in such a way that satisfy N F G > 2 s . Considering this constraint as well as those described in Section III-D, our search results for parameters of the suitable codes results various examples. Depending on the code rate, we have selected n 0 , q, m which is summarized in Table III  and IV. For the permutation matrix, its block size, l, must be chosen at least to the extent that the condition l! > 2 s holds. With this in mind, the block length can be kept considerably short. Giving an example, if l33 then l! > 2 120 . For the PRNG, the length of the seed must be simply chosen larger than the security parameter, s.
2) Ciphertext-Only Attack: The goal of this attack is to recover the plaintext from its ciphertext without any knowledge of the key. In code-based cryptosystems, this is interpreted as decoding a coded message without access to its parity check or generator matrices. To achieve this goal the adversary needs to solve the general decoding problem, which is known as an NP-hard problem [2] . This cryptanalysis was applied on the McEliece-like public-key code-based cryptosystems [32] - [34] , whose public generator matrix is algebraically equivalent to their secret key generator matrix. Since in all symmetric key code-based schemes the parity-check matrix is kept secret, this attack is not feasible on our scheme in polynomial time.
3) Message Resend Attack: The aim of the message resend attack is to find the perturbation vector, e P , used by the transmitter and then recover the message in the following manner. Suppose that the transmitter sends c 1 = (mG + e P 1 )P to the receiver. The attacker, as the man in the middle, alter some bits of c 1 such that the receiver receives a false or undecodable vector. Therefore, the receiver has to make a request to the transmitter for resending the message, m. This time, the transmitter encrypt the same message, using a different perturbation vector e P 2 , as c 2 = (mG + e P 2 )P . This scenario is called message resend [35] . In this situation, the attacker has access to two different ciphertexts c 1 and c 2 of the same message m. So the attacker can obtain the following equation and thereby guessing the positions of non-zero entries of e P 1 and e P 2 .
This attack is only feasible when the perturbation vectors have low Hamming weight. Since the used perturbation vectors in the proposed scheme are generated uniformly at random, it is not feasible to find each of e P 1 and e P 2 from c 1 + c 2 . Moreover, the permutation matrix, P , changes the location of 1s and 0s.
Apart from these issues while applying this attack, error correction capability of capacity approaching FG-QC-LDPC codes could obviate the need for resending the message. Because the alterations made by the attacker can be recovered by the FG-QC-LDPC code. Thus, the message resend scenario does not occur.
4) Chosen-Plaintext Attack: There are two major chosen-plaintext attack scenarios against secret key code-based cryptosystems, namely Struik-Tilburg [5] and Rao-Nam [36] attacks. a) Struick-Tilburg Attack: Struik and Tilburg [5] proposed a chosen-plaintext attack against secret-key code-based cryptosystems. In this attack two plaintexts m 1 and m 2 are chosen in a way that they are only different on their i th position, i.e. m 1 − m 2 = u i . As a result, the corresponding ciphertext difference is given below, c 1 − c 2 = u i GP + (e P 1 − e P 2 )P = g The work factor of this attack is of Ω(knN 2 e log 2 (N e )) [35] . Therefore, this attack will be successful if the set of all perturbation vectors, N e , has small cardinality. In FG-QC-LDPC joint encryption-encoding scheme N e = 2 (n−k) and according to Table III and IV min(n − k = p) = 255. So the work factor of this attack is of Ω(1275 × 1530 × 2 510 × 255) which is dramatically large and therefore the Struik-Tilburg attack is not applicable to the FG-QC-LDPC joint encryption-encoding scheme in polynomial time.
b) Rao-Nam Attack: Rao and Nam [36] proposed their attack based on the previously mentioned Struik-Tilburg [5] attack. They similarly used chosen-plaintexts m 1 and m 2 differing only in one position. They noticed that when the perturbation vectors has low Hamming distance the the attacker can use majority voting to estimate g ′ i and thereby revealing the whole matrix G ′ . The work factor of this attack, obtained by Rao and Nam [35] , is Ω(N k e ). Based on Table  III and IV, The minimum work factor of this attack on our proposed scheme is Ω(255 1275 ). Therefore, the FG-QC-LDPC joint scheme is far more secure to be threatened by this attack.
B. Key Size
The secret key of the FG-QC-LDPC joint encryption-encoding scheme as mentioned in Section III-A consists of the seed vector for a PRNG (S), the parity check matrix (H), and the permutation matrix (P ).
First, choosing a suitable PRNG for each application, keeps the size of the seed at a desirable extent. Comparing PRNGs is not in the scope of this paper. However, as pointed in Section I, it is not recommended to use simple LFSRs based on the reasons mentioned in [13] . In our example, we simply exploit Sosemanuk-128 stream cipher as a PRNG [37] . The size of the seed vector of this PRNG is only 128 bits.
Owing to quasi-cyclic structure of the parity check matrix, storing only the first row of each circulant block of this matrix suffices to create the parity check matrix. Furthermore, thanks to the finite geometry construction of these blocks, the whole first row of each block can be produced by only knowing the location of two "1"s on each. Since each row is an incident vector of a line on finite geometry, the two "1"s indicate the two points where a line go through them. Thus, these two location numbers can regenerate the line and its incident vector.
We introduce a practical method to achieve the information theoretic lower bound for storing the first row of each circulant block. In this regard, we need to identify two things, the representative of cyclic class and the number of cyclic right shift to obtain the first row. The following constraints must be considered to assign a unique line as a representative for each cyclic class.
i) The first element of its incident vector must be "1".
ii) The next "1" in the incident vector must be located at the nearest possible locations among all lines of the class.
If the non-zero elements of the incident vector of the representative are α j1 , α j2 , . . . , α jρ , (i) forces that j 1 = 0 and (ii) forces j 2 −j 1 < min (j i+1 − j i ), (j 1 − j ρ )(mod p). By using this method we only store j 2 to indicate the cyclic class. This needs only ⌈log 2 ( p ρ )⌉ bits. Another ⌈log 2 (p)⌉ bits is needed to indicate the amount of cyclic shift for the first row of each block. As a result, the amount of memory to store each circulant block of FG-QC-LDPC parity check matrix is as follows.
While a permutation in the rows of the parity check matrix makes no difference in the code, we can suppose that the first circulant block (or one of the others) made by the representative without being cyclically shifted. As a result, the whole parity check matrix with one block row and n 0 blocks needs the following amount of memory to be stored.
The block diagonal permutation matrix, P , in this scheme will be stored in similar way as in [6] . The size of the permutation matrix of the key is as follows. Where l is the length of each block and l ′ = 2 ⌊log 2 (l)⌋ .
Table V and VI show examples of codes and their key sizes for 80 bits and 120 bits security parameters, respectively.
The key size of the proposed scheme, taking the advantages of FG-QC-LDPC codes, decreases to 319 bits where the key size of the last known similar system was 2272 bits [10] . Table  VII compares the key size of the proposed system with those known similar systems. 
C. Error Performance
At the receiver the FG-QC-LDPC code used in our system is decoded by a logarithmic Sum-Product decoder. We took the following considerations to simulate encoding, channel, and decoding processes. In our simulation codewords transmitted via a Quadratic Phase Shift Keying (QPSK) channel with additive white Gaussian noise. The receiver has access to soft information from channel. We compared decoders of 10 and 100 iterations with a Reed-Solomon code in Fig. 2 . This figure shows that there is no remarkable improvement in 100 iterations decoding in compare to 10 iterations. Thus, to avoid unreasonable complexity we suggest 10 iterations decoder.
D. Complexity
There is two separate process which their computational complexity needs to be assessed, encryption-encoding and decryption-decoding processes.
1) Encryption-Encoding: The complexity of this process can be calculated as follows.
C Enc = C mul (mG) + C add (mG + e P ) + (30) C mul (H −1 .s) + C mul (P ) In this equation C add (mG + e P ) stands for adding two n-bit vectors which consume n binary operations. Multiplying a vector by a sparse matrix a 1n B nn , needs nw binary operations [37] , where w is the Hamming weight of rows of the sparse matrix. Here permutation matrix, P , has w = 1 so C mul (P ) = n.
The generator matrix, G, and the inverse of parity check matrix, H −1 , are dense matrices and needs kn and (n − k)n binary operations respectively. By the way, their quasi cyclic property leads to a 92% lower computational complexity in multiplying operation [38] . Therefor we can conclude that:
C Enc = 0.08 × k.n + n + 0.08 × (n − k).n + n (31) = 0.08n + 2 R where R = k n . 2) Decryption-Decoding: The complexity of this process is obtained as follow.
C Dec = C mul (r × P −1 ) + C add (r ′ + e P ) (32)
The complexity of the Sum-Product Algorithm is as follows [37] .
In this equation I avg is the average number of decoding iterations and d is the number of quantization bits in analog-to-digital converter. Finally letting I avg = 10 and d = 6, the number of binary operations for each information bit to be decrypted-decoded is,
In this equation it is obvious that the complexity of decryption-decoding algorithm is linearly proportional to the redundancy of utilized code (n − k).
V. CONCLUSION
This paper introduces a joint encryption-encoding scheme, also known as secure channel coding, using QC-LDPC codes based on finite geometry. We have taken advantage of FG-QC-LDPC codes to shorten the secret key to 20% of that of the best known similar systems.
Thanks to the LDPC codes and its fast iterative decoding, the error performance of the proposed scheme is among the best of the literature. The FG-QC-LDPC joint encryption-encoding scheme is secure against all known cryptanalyses of such cryptosystems.
The joint algorithm leads to lower complexity than conventional encryption-then-encoding methods. We have shown that our system can provide reliability and security simultaneously with the lower cost of one joint system rather than two disjoint systems.
